Insider-Outsider Roles and Relations
July 2001
This paper is based on preliminary findings from the case studies and consultations carried out by the RPP Project/Phase I. It is not intended as a final product of the Project. Rather, its purpose is to elicit further thinking, experience, ideas and suggestions from the community of people and agencies engaged in peace practice. From May 2001 through May 2002, a series of consultations and workshops will be carried out to encourage this kind of challenging interaction with the ideas presented here. This process will produce much greater clarity and agreement around the issue and the results from this will be available by July 2002.
I. THE ISSUE
When most outsider peace agencies and practitioners become involved in "other people's conflicts", they expect to play a supporting role to those forces working for peace internally. It is commonly acknowledged that "local people need to be the ones to make peace".
In deciding how to be helpful, outsiders make strategic choices about "how" to operate in that setting. Do they partner with existing local peace agencies? Do they support the development of new ones? Or do they "go it alone" in ways that they perceive will support the peace process writ large?
There are many different ways that outside agencies can and do support insiders working for peace. Are there different roles for insiders and outsiders that are generalizable across contexts? Which are the most useful outsider roles in helping people achieve lasting peace? What do " good" relationships between insider and outsider peace agencies look like and how does this relate to the effectiveness of their joint efforts?
II. DEFINING INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS
The focus of this paper, as with RPP more generally, is on agencies or activists that are explicitly concerned with working on conflict for peace. It is not concerned with all possible insider and outsider actors (such as multinational corporations, militaries, politicians, etc.) that also play critical roles in war and peace.
Intuitively the terms "insider" and "outsider" are suggestive, and are commonly used. But many practitioners also express misgivings about such terminology, since, on close examination, firm distinctions become blurred. The many grey areas suggest there are layers of "insiderness" or "outsiderness".
For example, is someone from the Diaspora, who cares deeply about the conflict in his/her homeland, an "insider" or an "outsider?" Is an expatriate married to a local person an "insider" or an "outsider?" Is a person from a peaceful area of a country an "insider" or an "outsider" to a conflict between groups in another part of the country? Is a Scandinavian agency based for years in Colombia an "insider" or an "outsider"? Is a Kenyan peace worker more of an "insider" to a conflict in Uganda than an American one? Clearly, easy categorization is impossible and, to some degree, individuals and groups self-categorize-depending on their experiences, loyalties, and biases.
For the purposes of this paper the terms will be used as follows. An "insider" is an individual or group living within, or in some other way deeply identifying with a given conflict. An "outsider" is an individual or agency from outside the conflict area that chooses to become involved in a given conflict. A sub-text of this identity is that "insiders" always experience the conflict and live with its consequences; while "outsiders" can leave and work elsewhere.
Making this distinction can help illuminate the particular strengths of insiders and outsiders in a way that can help outsiders maximize the effectiveness of their efforts to help.
III. EVIDENCE FROM THE CASES
All 26 RPP cases were chosen to include some interaction between outsider and insider peace agencies in order to help understand this dynamic. This took a wide range of forms.
Some cases showed explicit partnerships on specific peace programs.
| A civic group organized to address conflict between ethnic groups in their country. They conducted an open public consensus building process around inequalities in the constitution, whose recommendations were take up by the government. Over many years an international NGO provided a range of support: consulting with Diaspora groups, providing advice, bringing in international experts, and assisting with external fundraising. The international agency was in constant email communication with its partners and visited the country periodically. |
Other cases show loose coordination of independent efforts.
| Many organizations worked side by side (rather than together) to support the peace communities, though they expressed differences with each other. Community members looked to the local and national organizations for communication, close assistance, understanding of the history and perceptions. They looked to national organizations for training, contact with government and coordination within the country. They looked to internationals for protection as independent observers and for raising international awareness of their situation. |
Another common approach was for outsiders to help insider activists start new agencies.
| An international NGO established a national conflict management agency in the country. They provided training, advice, program models, and secured funding for an initial period. As the national agency gained experience, it took control of its own programming and fundraising inside the country, and partnered with the international agency on regional-scale programs. |
In other cases, insider agencies brought in (hired) outsider agencies and specialists.
| The peace agency brought in a foreign consultant who had researched methods of conflict resolution in that context, to advise them on facilitation methods for a large-scale meeting. |
| As the demand for mediation and negotiation skills increased further, the national peace agency retained a foreign trainer as a full time staff member dedicated to skills development. |
There were several RPP cases where outsiders directly conducted programs with participants, with no involvement of insider peace agencies or activists beyond information sharing.
A. ROLES
The cases suggest that it is helpful to distinguish between the roles that insiders and outsiders play and the relationship between insiders and outsiders.
In the RPP cases, insider peace agencies tended to play the following roles (in order of frequency).
| Role Played by Insiders | Observed in # of Cases (X out of 26) |
| Holding public meetings, media programs, etc. that "model" tolerance and intercommunal cooperation | 18 |
| "Bridge Building" (creating and increasing contacts) between polarized parties / people from both sides of the conflict | 16 |
| Reaching out to involve many local people in peace activities, working at the community level, outside major urban centers, etc. | 16 |
| Bringing in outside "resources" for dealing with conflict (trainings, learning projects, international experts, comparative experience). | 16 |
| Providing training and conceptual models (in non-violence, dealing with conflict, mediation) | 13 |
| Lobbying leaders to enter negotiations, make compromises | 11 |
| Advocating for concrete changes/policies on issues related to the conflict | 10 |
| Working to limit human rights abuses (through monitoring, media attention, and accompaniment) | 9 |
| Acting as intermediaries or facilitators of contact between the parties | 9 |
| Mobilizing popular will for peace (demonstrations, marches, meetings, etc.) | 8 |
| Providing psycho-social support, counseling, lending a sympathetic ear | 7 |
| Providing concrete humanitarian and social assistance | 6 |
| Establishing new institutions to manage conflict non-violently | 5 |
| Creating Joint projects (involving people from both sides) | 5 |
| Establishing / supporting zones of peace (neutrality) | 2 |
Outsiders played the following roles (below, in order of frequency in the cases).
| Role Played by Outsiders | Observed in # Cases (X out of 26) |
| Providing/securing external funding for insider work | 20 |
| Providing trainings and conceptual models to insider activists and agencies | 19 |
| Lobbying governments to change policies (international and local) | 14 |
| Offering "solidarity" to insiders | 14 |
| Providing strategic consulting to insiders | 12 |
| Encouraging international media attention on the conflict, human rights, and peace efforts | 12 |
| Taking insiders out of the conflict region for education, dialogue, trainings, rest, new perspectives, etc. | 12 |
| Providing support to establish new insider agencies | 11 |
| Bringing in outsider specialists to share expertise | 10 |
| Providing opportunities for insiders to compare/reflect on experiences from other conflicts | 9 |
| Active dialogue facilitation between disputing parties (often using external models) | 9 |
| "Bridge-Building" (creating and increasing contacts) between polarized parties | 9 |
| Providing counseling, "psycho-social support", "lending a sympathetic ear" | 8 |
| Providing concrete humanitarian/development aid | 8 |
| Creating / supporting joint projects | 6 |
| Inter-positioning selves between weapons and people or physical accompaniment of insider actors in order to prevent violence | 4 |
| Supporting/initiating research on aspects of the conflict, context, options for peace | 2 |
Insider and outsider agencies in the cases often played several roles simultaneously, and changed roles over time as their strategy developed.
The two lists above show that insiders and outsider played some of the same roles and some different roles.
Roles that only insiders tended to play were often related to their ability to reach out to large numbers of people in the society, to mobilize people in the context, to "model" behaviors and take a stand for concrete preferred outcomes as members of a given society.
Roles that outsiders played more often than insiders revolved around mobilizing links to external constituencies (foreign governments, the media, international public opinion) or resources (funding, ideas, etc.).
There were many roles that both insiders and outsiders played (bridge building, training, acting as an intermediary, counseling, establishing new institutions, providing humanitarian aid, creating joint projects, etc.). Whether insiders or outsiders played these roles in a given case was often very context specific, and tied to issues of:
Reach and Access: In most cases, insiders were able to reach large numbers of people in the society and gain access to certain people (political elites, intellectuals) due to their command of cultural norms, social positions, language, etc. In some cases however, outsiders had better access to certain elites (due to foreign connections, prestige, promise of outside resources).
Credibility: The ease with which agencies were seen as credible (and trusted) by parties to the conflict varied greatly across contexts (and depended on the particular role an agency wanted to play). Some cases reported that outsiders "generated greater trust" since they were seen as "removed", "objective", and "with no political agenda". Other cases showed that national and local agencies had much more credibility with parties.
| Potential participants within the countries often react differently to a foreign approach. These participants are more likely to trust a person who has knowledge and experience of the culture. |
Ability to Influence: The cases generally show that outsiders are better placed to influence external constituencies (governments, international media and public opinion), while insiders are better placed to influence domestic public opinion.
| The outsider agency was well aware that its international status gave it leverage in two ways, both the carrot of possible aid and investment from international agencies, and the stick of international publicity, and possible sanctions. |
Independence from Influence /Interference: The cases showed that in general, insiders were more susceptible to influence and interference from national and local political authorities.
| The agency was registered as a branch of an 'international NGO'. Some felt a decision to localize would be a " disaster" and lead to far more restrictions and string pulling by the authorities. In a neighbouring town, almost all the organizations were local and they spent a lot of time trying to overcome all sorts of obstacles |
However, some cases showed that ceding influence to local political authorities did not always have a negative effect on the activity conducted.
| The local peace agency felt it had to cede control of selection of delegates to a peace conference to the local chiefs. Contrary to concerns, this overt role for local authorities did not undermine the process and the meeting led to a peace covenant and many binding agreements. |
Outsiders with other agendas (such as humanitarian assistance) tended to be susceptible to influence /interference from local and national authorities as well.
| The agency began to feel that the pressure from political elites who were part of the dialogue process threatened its ability to effectively engage in humanitarian work. |
Staying Power: Insiders by their very nature are present in the conflict setting, and in the cases showed greater ability and willingness to maintain programs and presence over the long term. Many very effective insider programs developed over a long period of time and much trial and error. Some outsider agencies pursuing another mandate (humanitarian actors or religious groups) also had long-term staying power in an area.
B. RELATIONSHIPS
Insiders and outsiders have experiences of both positive and negative relationships in partnering. A key element of relationships between them is the balance of power and whose agenda dominates. The cases show that most agencies, both insiders and outsiders, are aware of perceptions of power imbalance and try to address them in different ways, with mixed success.
| Staff from an international agency traveled to the country of their local partners in order to discuss and plan new programs. The agency undertook intensive meetings over several days with its partners, at the end of which staff felt a consensus existed around a strategic plan. However, on return back home, they heard that their local partners felt the plan did not reflect most of their priorities. By phone their partners explained that, in their culture, when guests visit, the hosts refrain from criticizing or challenging them. |
| The agency purposefully avoided external funding or partnering with international NGOs as they conducted community meetings, peace education work, and public peace marches and campaigns in their country. Though their small size and volunteer nature sometimes impeded their ability to follow-up consistently, or recruit a large membership, they preferred to maintain independence from direct outside support. |
In the cases, the issue of dominance between insider and outside peace agencies working together translates into who controls key decision-making and sets the agenda for the initiative. The cases show situations where either insiders or outsiders dominate due to:
Whose analysis of the conflict is the basis for the strategy?
Who determines issues like program strategies, priorities, and timing? Who decides the speed at which a process should go forward, what is politically palatable, what is necessary to make progress and what is too risky? Of course, in any given setting there are no "monolithic" insider or outsider views - but an array of insider and outsider views. But in any given partnership, insiders and outsiders may have a different analysis of the conflict and what should be done. In some partnerships insider and outsider analysis may coincide, in others one will dominate over/convince the other.
Intangible characteristics of dominance
These include things that create a situation of dominance, often inadvertently, due to the characteristics of the agencies themselves or key personalities in them. These include charismatic personal style, prestige and reputation, access (to specific kinds of funding, or political elites or the media), and authoritativeness.
Dominance in relationships between insider and outsider peace practitioners can be represented as a continuum, with insider dominance on one side, and outsider dominance on the other. The cases also show that dominance by insiders or outsiders is not fixed, but rather can shift during the duration of the partnership.
C. ROLES, RELATIONSHIPS AND DOMINANCE
There is a pervasive belief among many peace practitioners that playing certain roles confers dominance to external agencies (and furthermore that this external dominance undermines the effectiveness of the initiative overall.) There are three roles in particular, that when played by outsiders, lead to this expectation of outsider dominance over insider partners.
- When outsiders provide substantial external funding for peace work
- When outsiders provide external models and methodologies to address conflict
- When outsiders create joint projects (between people on both sides), which often include both external funding and external models
This expectation was so strong that several cases showed insiders avoiding partnerships with outside agencies for fear of being corrupted by external agendas or becoming dependent and changed by external funding. All the other outsider roles listed earlier did not lead to an expectation or assumption of outsider dominance in the RPP cases.
However, in contrast to this expectation, the cases show that there is not a direct correlation between the roles played by insiders and outsiders and the balance of power in the relationship between them. Even with the three elements that often lead to outsider dominance (external funding, models and joint projects), in the cases these roles did not automatically dictate which agency was more dominant. For example:
- RPP cases showed peace initiatives where insiders received large amounts of external funding that resulted in the dominance of the outsider agenda.
The international agencies involved in the project were committed to long-term funding and capacity building of their local partners. For the first year, the new local agencies were to conduct a certain type and number of seminars with local constituents in the language of the region. Eventually the local centers were expected to take on more independent programming. Other cases showed, despite dependence on outside funding, insiders retaining full control of the strategy, decision-making and conduct of the process.
The majority of funds for the large-scale peace meetings were raised from a diverse set of international funders. Often the 'strings attached' (preferences for some type of work) hindered their strategic planning, but the local agency designed and directed the meetings, often in partnership with those even "more inside" such as local community leaders. - In some cases when outsiders provided and implemented external models for peace work, the result was dominance by and dependence on the outsiders.
An international agency spearheaded a peace advocacy campaign based on international norms for protection of civilians in conflict. The agency built a steering committee of INGOs and national NGOs to guide the effort and ensure its responsiveness to local agendas. The process of reaching agreement among diverse agencies was difficult. The international agency found itself planning activities, raising funds, and setting the agenda more than it had hoped. In other cases, outside models or concepts were brought into a setting but insiders were firmly in control of the process.
An agency conducted trainings in dealing with conflict based closely on the training models pioneered by a European organization. The agency did not see itself as dependent on its foreign partner, on the contrary it developed its own separate activities, partners, and funders both inside and outside the region. - Finally, joint projects, which often involved both outside funds and external models sometimes led to dominance by outsiders and continued dependence on outsider initiative.
An international agency created multi-ethnic community working groups to support consensus on assistance projects to be funded by the agency, and improve community relations. While in one town, the working group 'took off', in others they remained vehicles for aid distribution that did not develop firm roots or have much reported impact on community tensions. In other cases, outsiders initiated joint projects but insiders set the agenda (sometimes in different ways than the outsider had intended).
Where populations from both sides lived in an uneasy ceasefire, an international agency initiated a 'youth centers' project, based on a model from another conflict zone. The local counterparts (youth groups from each population) insisted on separate centers as it was "too soon" after the war to join forces. The international agency funded the building and equipping of the centers, and once completed, each center provided sports and education opportunities for the isolated youth of the region. Youth would use "the other side's" facility if a particular activity was only offered there, but primarily each community used its own center. While the funding agency saw the centers were valued, it questioned whether this had really been a 'peace project'.
D. EFFECTIVENESS
There is the pervasive belief that since local people need to be the ones to make peace, that outsider dominance of peace initiatives is undesirable (and by extension, a reason for ineffectiveness of peace efforts). However, in the RPP cases where there was outsider dominance of the agenda, sometimes this led to poor outcomes, but sometimes it did not.
In fact, the cases show five situations of externally dominated programming improving the situation of conflict and contributing in potentially significant ways to peace. In these situations, outsiders "pushed things" beyond what insiders were willing or able to do, and this led to outcomes that were seen by local agencies and people as useful and positive.
| An external academic organization initiated a series of consultations among key players on both sides on security issues, which many local people felt was too risky and sensitive to undertake. Recommendations from this confidential process were key to an interim agreement eventually made between the parties. |
| An external agency invited political groups excluded from the formal peace talks, to informal meetings with elites and officials from both sides. This unofficial dialogue process was seen as key to getting volatile outlier groups involved in the peace process and, at times, was used as an alternative forum to help overcome obstacles in the formal peace talks. |
| External peace agencies initiated informal meetings between citizens from both sides of a conflict in neutral locations. Local peace activists had initially felt this would be too sensitive, and the internationals spent years working separately with each side before meetings involving both sides were held. This led to the dramatic growth of local groups initiating such activities. |
| An international humanitarian agency that had operated in the region for many years mobilized its wide-ranging contacts on both sides to bring conflicting parties together in negotiations and dialogue. Many local actors later gave the agency credit for unexpected key breakthroughs in the peace process. |
| An international coalition of peace agencies established a presence to support local peace and human rights NGOs. They also built channels of communication with the national government, accused of supporting abuses in the area. At first, local NGOs opposed the coalition's approach. But as it began to lobby the government and foreign diplomats and gain attention for human rights abuses, some local NGOs began to see the coalition's unorthodox role as useful. |
The above examples highlight an important puzzle and many remaining questions for RPP. If outsider dominance does not inherently result in ineffective programs, what is the connection between "good" insider outsider relationships and effective peace work?
Views reported in the cases suggest that 'good' (i.e. mutually valued) insider - outsider relationships are characterized by:
- Sustainability of insider efforts once outsider programming/funding is phased out.
- Recognition of outsider inputs as valuable and supportive (insiders feel reenergized, supported, inspired, or having applied new insights versus undermined, or bypassed).
- Roles played by outsiders add something new that insider can't obtain independently.
- There are shared criteria by which to evaluate and improve their working relationship.
Yet, how can we make sense of the fact that even relationships that both outsiders and insiders agree are "good", "healthy", or "mutually beneficial" might not lead to ending violence and creating durable peace?
In addition, though the cases show us something about what roles outsiders tend to play, they also show much overlap between outsider and insider roles. In what circumstances should outsiders play which roles? Who should decide? The latter points to the interactions and relationships between insiders and outsiders as critical in deciding on strategies of working for peace. What benchmarks are there for understanding the quality of these insider - outsider interactions? How do these relate to the effectiveness of the strategies, once decided, in helping to end war?